Monday, May 11, 2009

Abilify, the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, and "Akathisia-gate"

Clin psych has posted this enlightening and relevant article about the efforts of Otsuka and Bristol-Myers Squibb to distract our attention from the major side effect of Abilify, which is akathisia. As he mentions, in the trials leading to Abilify's FDA approval for augmentation of antidepressants (you can watch one of their recent TV commercials here, but do so quickly, before BMS forces YouTube to take it off their site) the rate of akathisia, or extreme and debilitating restlessness, was 25% on Abilify as opposed to 4% in the placebo group.

Here's what Abilify's akathisia looks like outside of the scrubbed fantasy land of hired guns and PR companies. For several years I have treated a woman in her 40s with bipolar disorder who had been fairly stable on Tegretol, an anticonvulsant that is FDA approved for the treatment of manic episodes. But over the last few months, she has become involved in a pyramic marketing scheme and has ended up in serious debt. We both agreed this represented a manic episode, and decided to switch her from Tegretol to another medication, preferably one that did not cause any weight gain. She had not responded well to lithium in the past, Depakote and most of the atypical antipsychotics were out of the question because of their weight gain side effects, so I recommended a trial of Abilify.

"Let's start at 5 mg a day," I said, "then we can increase to 10 mg if we need to."

This was on a Thursday, and over the weekend, she left messages at my office saying that she felt incredibly "shaky," anxious, had insomnia, and just felt all around terrible. She didn't call my emergency coverage, but on Monday I spoke to her and found out that she had in fact increased the Abilify to 10 mg after a couple of days, clearly worsening her akathisia. I recommended she stop it, but she was reluctant, saying she wanted to give it a shot. So I prescribed the tranquilizer Klonopin, and told her to decrease the Abilify dose back to 5 mg. Over the next few days, she became less shaky, and calmer.

Her case is a work in progress, and I'll provide updates in the future. The point here is that this is the side effect that is so common for Abilify, and one that authors paid by BMS chose to play down in a paper apparently written by an employee of Phase V, a medical education company paid for by BMS.

Will my patient ultimately do well on Abilify? I hope so. But it is crucially important for BMS, Otsuka, and their various minions to be accurate about the dangers of the drug, so that doctors can use it appropriately and prevent the kinds of side effects my patient suffered. Publishing an article that was carefully crafted to draw attention away from Abilify's main liability was shameful, and is exactly the kind of deceptive editorial practice that we as a society can no longer tolerate.

Tuesday, May 5, 2009

The Comparative Effectiveness Wars: Three Views from NEJM

Who would have thought that a proposal to funnel $1.1 billion into comparative effectiveness research (CER) would have caused such vicious battles? Battles get this vicious when someone has money to lose, and in this case the biggest losers are those drug companies which depend on me-too drugs for their profits. For them, CER is a stake through the heart.

The current issue of the the New England Journal of Medicine has three articles in its Perspectives section about CER that are well-worth reading if you have the time. (Oddly, the new issue is not yet online, hence the lack of hyperlinks in this posting. Get your act together, Mass Medical Society!)

First, Garber and Tunis put the spotlight on one common argument against CER--that it would somehow stymie efforts to improve personalized medicine. One of the main examples of personalized medicine is using new genetic tests to decide whether specific treatments are likely to work best in specific patients. The authors point out that genomic medicine, as this is sometimes called, has yielded little of clinical use. This is not because the evil insurance companies doen't want to pay for the testing, but because the science has not clearly demonstrated its utility.

I have to agree. In psychiatry, for example, I wrote this article about an ill-fated antipsychotic called iloperidone ("Fanapta") that was being marketed by Vanda Pharmaceuticals as a great advance in personalized medicine. Unfortunately, the company was unable to muster convincing enough data that its genetic testing protocol was truly helpful and the product was rejected by the FDA. Actually, money spent on CER would benefit personalized medicine by helping doctors to decide which genetic tests are valuable, and which are useless.

Next, Jerry Avorn weighs in with a trenchant analysis of how a coalition of pharmaceutical companies and their minions created a series of false debating points which, luckily, have thus far not convinced the Obama administration to scale back the program. Avorn aptly describes the nadir of this debate:

The radio talk-show host Rush Limbaugh then disseminated this message to millions of listeners, warning that once the stimulus bill "computerizes everybody's health record," a new federal bureaucracy "will monitor treatments to make sure your doctor is doing what the federal government deems appropriate."

Actually, CER is all about generating new knowledge to make better medical decisions, and not about denying care. But companies that rely on aggressive marketing rather than creating novel products are threatened by scientific inquiry.

Finally, Naik and Peterson point out that while comparative research is all fine and dandy, without a parallel effort to get doctors to actually use the findings in their practices, the money will be wasted. To quote them: "...a shift is needed from the 'science of recommendation to a science of implementation.'" Wise words indeed.

Thursday, April 30, 2009

Another Hired Gun Repents, This Time a Cardiologist

When it comes to conflicts of interest, cardiology is the new psychiatry.

Psychiatry is cleaning up its act through a combination of external forces and the profession’s own commitment to ethical rehab. But cardiology, a field awash in drug company cash, is only now taking baby steps in the right direction. The pace of change is about quicken, in part because of a remarkable cardiologist named James Stein, who was profiled yesterday in this article by John Fauber in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel.
Also, watch this video of his talk at a recent ethics conference.

James Stein is not your everyday cardiologist. He a full professor at the University of Wisconsin, and is one of the top researchers in the country, having invented techniques to use echocardiograms to take more precise measurements of atherosclerosis. He was named one of the top 20 cardiologists in the country by Men’s Magazine.

Dr. Stein, like me, used to be a hired gun for the pharmaceutical industry. Unlike me, he was in the game at the highest levels, having been on speakers' bureaus, advisory boards, and research steering committees for many different companies. It all started when he was a 29 year old cardiology fellow. His academic mentor could not make it for a scheduled promotional talk and invited Stein to pinch hit for him. Stein gave the talk, and was handed a sealed envelope containing a $500 check. According to the Journal Sentinel article:

"I got a pat on the back and he said, 'There's more where that came from, son.' I had no idea what that meant, but I went home and paid off part of my student loans," Stein said in a presentation at UW this month.

One thing led to another. From the article:

Over the years, many of the big names in the drug industry would hire Stein to give speeches or serve as a consultant, eventually leading to fees of $2,000 to $3,000 per talk....For instance, in 2005 Stein did work for six drug makers, according to a disclosure form filed with UW. That year, Pfizer paid him between $10,000 and $20,000 for four days of work as a speaker and advisory board member. LipoScience, a firm that markets a cholesterol test, paid him $10,000 to $20,000 for four days of similar work. Another firm, Schering-Plough, paid him about $12,000 for two days as a lecturer.

Like all hired guns who hop onto gravy train with the best of intentions, Stein thought he was providing added value for everyone concerned. In his videotaped talk at UW, Stein characterized this as an apparent “win-win-win-win situation” in which he benefitted financially and professionally, patients benefitted from the education he provided to their doctors, his university reaped benefits in prestige and the drug companies sold more of their products.

When journalists started publishing the amounts of money he and other opinion leaders made from their talks, he went on the offensive, arguing that such relationships were fine:

“I defended my relationships with industry by saying that conflicts were inevitable for successful researchers, that my relationships with industry helped build bridges, that my talks always were educational, that this was part of the UW mission, and that at the end of the day I saved lives by educating people about the medications and diseases states I spoke about.” (This and most of the quotes that follow are from my transcription of his recent talk).

Inside, however, he said he felt embarrassed about the public disclosures of his income and noted that many of his patients made a pittance in comparison, and sometimes could not even afford their medications. He decided to make some changes. He pushed for better disclosure policies at the university, he sent letters to his patients disclosing his industry relationships, and he decided to donate all his promotional money to charity.

Even with all his growing misgivings, he continued to give the talks because, as he put it:
“I was sure I could avoid bias because I controlled the content and I had these strong personal convictions.” But then, things changed: “Well, unfortunately, over the past several months, I’ve learned that I was wrong. I’ve learned that I could not stay unbiased, that I could not control all the content of my talks, and that my personal convictions were not good enough.”

In fact, he said he realized that everybody is a little biased, even physicians, and not because they are evil, but because they are human. He noted that bias is inevitable in research, and that no one is insulted when they are told that certain research designs are off limits because they would lead to bias.

“So I ask myself, why are physicians so insulted when similar influences might be influencing us in our patient care?”

He realized that he was wrong in supposing that simply disclosing his relationships with industry was enough:

“I really felt that if I stood up in front of a crowd and said that these are my disclosures, look how honest I am, that I was really managing conflict of interest. But actually the medical literature and the social science literature tells me that it is actually the opposite effect. Although it is laudable to disclose your relationships, actually thinking that disclosure manages relationships is harmful. It has the perverse effect that when you disclose your relationship, the recipient of your information becomes more trusting, and the social scientists also have shown us that professionals who disclose actually become more biased…. I would argue … that the solution is not disclosure, because if you are doing something that is wrong or unethical, don’t disclose, just don’t do it!”

He also realized that every drug company he had worked with over the past 15 years had been fined or convicted for ethical or legal violations involving activities like off-label marketing or suppression of data.

Finally, he was particularly disturbed to realize that accredited CME had been adopted as a marketing technique by drug companies.

“I trusted continuing medical education but what I found was that many times it was a sanitized way of presenting a marketing message….My personal conclusion is that the medical device and pharmaceutical industries are no longer trustworthy partners in medical education.”

As of Dec 31 of 2008, Dr. Stein ended all of his industry interactions that were not related to bona fide research activities.

Congratulations, Dr. Stein. Welcome to the small but growing “I’ve Had It” club of former hired guns!

Wednesday, April 29, 2009

Historic IOM Report: A Knock-Out Blow to Greed in Medicine


The long awaited report on conflict of interest from the Institute of Medicine has been released, and it is a landmark document in the history of medicine.

Before reviewing the report, what is the Institute of Medicine, and why is everybody making such a fuss about what it has to say? The IOM was created in 1970 by the federal government as part of the National Academy of Sciences. According to its website, “The nation turns to the Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the National Academies
for science-based advice on matters of biomedical science, medicine, and health.”

You can think of the IOM as the most important advisor to Congress and the White House on medical issues. It is not formally a part of the government, and therefore none of its recommendations have the force of law. However, when the IOM speaks, everybody who is anybody listens very closely.

This 300 page report, formally titled “Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, Education and Practice,” can be accessed here.


Pared down to the essentials, its recommendations are:


1. Drug companies must disclose any payments they make to doctors, hospitals, and many other institutions. This is similar to the proposed Physician Payments Sunshine Act, but goes further because it recommends that these financial disclosures extend to consumer groups (such as the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill), medical societies (i.e., the American College of Cardiology, which is the new poster child for industry money-lust), and medical education companies. Basically, IOM is saying, “no more hiding any money that you may be using to surreptitiously influence medical care.” This is an extremely powerful and sweeping recommendation, and will complete the process of bringing integrity back to medicine.

2. Doctors should no longer accept any free meals, gifts or other items from companies. Various academic medical centers have already announced such rules but they vary in the details. For instance, Johns Hopkins says "no gifts" except expensive medical textbooks and educational charts, and "no free meals" except for a long list of examples where free meals are okay. IOM endorses a very simple policy—no meals or gifts of any kind.

3. Doctors must not participate in speaker’s bureaus for drug companies.

4. Doctors must not do clinical research if they have a financial interest in the outcome of the research. As Dr. Carroll points out in Health Care Renewal,
this rule would have prevented the unfortunate series of events involving Dr. Alan Schatzberg, Stanford University and the NIH.

5. Revamp the system of continuing medical education (CME) so that there is no more industry influence in the content.

The actual verbatim recommendation regarding CME is:

"RECOMMENDATION 5.3: A new system of funding accredited continuing medical education should be developed that is free of industry influence, enhances public trust in the integrity of the system, and provides high-quality education. A consensus development process that includes representatives of the member organizations that created the accrediting body for continuing medical education, members of the public, and representatives of organizations such as certification boards that rely on continuing medical education should be convened to propose within 24 months of the publication of this report a funding system that will meet these goals."

Industry funding of CME was the most controversial issue faced by the IOM, and you’ll notice that the above recommendation is rather artfully crafted to avoid explicitly calling for a ban on industry funding. In the subsequent discussion, the IOM explains that some committee members were worried about “unintended consequences” of an immediate funding ban, such as fewer courses. But guess what? There are far too many redundant industry-funded courses anyway, on the same topics over and over again—treatment of carefully hand-picked conditions with drugs made by the sponsor.

Nonetheless, later in their report, the IOM makes quite a strong statement anyway. Some industry funding might be acceptable, they say, but only if funneled into pooled sources of money over which the companies have no control. Crucially, direct funding—which constitutes essentially all of industry-funded CME as currently practiced--would be forbidden under the new system:

“Both direct company funding to institutions for specific continuing medical education programs and direct company provision of unrestricted grants to institutions offer clear opportunities for undue influence, particularly for continuing medical education providers that also receive the great majority of their funding from companies. A plan for a system free from industry influence would exclude such funding as well as funding from company-controlled foundations.” (section 5, page 32).

The bottom line is that this report will serve as the authoritative guide for medical centers and policy makers for the next several years as they clean up conflicts of interest in medicine. Change is coming, big time.

Monday, April 27, 2009

ACCME's Existential Crisis

ACCME (the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education) knows what it needs to do, but it is having a very hard time bringing itself to do it.

The pharmaceutical industry funds over half of all the education U.S. doctors receive, which is an embarrassment to our medical establishment and a danger to patients. Whenever I tell my patients that drug companies are in charge of most medical education, they react the same way--they shake their heads in an "are you serious?" expression of disbelief.


ACCME knows this system is inherently wrong but it also know that most of its income is dependent on the system.

Its latest effort to distance itself from the corrupted system over which it presides is to create a new category of "Commercial Support Free (TM)" CME. It's a strange proposal. It implies, of course, that CSF-CME (as I'll abbreviate it) is an essentially different kind of medical education from industry-supported CME. After all, if it were not different, then there would be no point in creating a separate category.

And how is CSF-CME different? It is presumably better in some way, because it is not tainted with the biasing influence of industry. As the industry-friendly journal Medical Marketing and Media has put it, the new designation is an official "Good Housekeeping Seal" for CME.

But herein lies the rub. The entire mission of the ACCME is to accredit only the cream of the crop of medical education. If it is now proposing to create a platinum category of truly unbiased CME, then what does this mean for industry CME? That it isn't very good. And now ACCME has boxed itself into a difficult position. If it is creating a second class citizen category of "not-as-good" medical education, why accredit it at all?

Perhaps this is a way for the organization to gradually transition toward a ban on commercial funding, a ban which the Board of Directors has announced is not in the cards any time soon. Thus, CSF-CME may be part of a 5 year plan to gradually wean CME off of industry funding. Here's how it would work. You create a category of the "best" CME, and, under the theory that "if you build it, they will come," you hope that doctors will naturally gravitate away from the phony tin courses and toward the platinum courses. This would hasten the shift of drug company money away from CME, and would make the eventual ban on industry funding a little less painful.

But, like gradually peeling off a bandaid, it won't really make it less painful for the MECCs--it will just make it more protracted, and more like slow torture. It's much better to simply rip the bandaid off in one fell swoop. The pain is harsh but brief, and we can all move on.

Friday, April 17, 2009

Partners COI Policy: Better than Hopkins, But Not Great

Partners has anounced that it will implement a new conflict of interest policy. You can read the press release and summary of the policy here. I also recommend reading the excellent Boston Globe coverage here.

The good:

--A sweeping ban of all gifts, including meals and textbooks. This makes it a true gift ban, unlike John's Hopkins half hearted gift ban which I panned here.
--While industry funds for CME will still be accepted, they will have to be pooled into a hospital-wide President's Fund, or they will have to be approved by a newly established "Educational Review Board." Any program that passes muster with this new ERB must be jointly funded by at least two companies, lessening the potential for product-specific promotional bias.
--Faculty will no longer be allowed to be hired guns for drug companies.

The bad:

Let's get real. Industry funds education in order to promote their products. Thus, any CME program that holds itself out as "independent" of industry influence, is inherently a deception. It's rather embarrassing that the Harvard hospitals, with their incredible endowments, brainpower, and prestige, can't simply get it together to do the right thing, which is to say: WE WON'T TAKE ANY DRUG COMPANY MONEY FOR PHYSICIAN EDUCATION.

Tuesday, April 14, 2009

Seroquel gets the Abilify FDA Treatment

The FDA's Psychopharmacological Advisory Committee voted last week to recommend that Seroquel be approved as an adjunctive treatment for depression, but it rejected AstraZeneca's request that the drug be approved as monotherapy treatment for depression or generalized anxiety disorder.

According to this
article in The Philadelphia Inquirer, "Panel members, including scientists from outside the FDA and consumer advocates, said Seroquel's risks in depression and anxiety outweighed its benefits."

One of the panel members, Richard Malone, explained that "the risks are fairly well-documented, and I don't think they are acceptable for this use."


While I agree with the committee's rejection of two indications, I'm concerned that they were inappropriately impressed by the Seroquel augmentation data. As far as I know, the augmentation studies have not been published, but a summary can be found on page 27 of AZ's briefing document. It looks like they used the same research design as BMS did in their Abilify augmentation studies, and that the Seroquel results were equally unimpressive (see this article at Clin Psych for a slam of the Abilify data). Seroquel reduced the MADRS depression score by about 15 points, while placebo decreased it by about 12 points. This 3 point advantage is tiny, considering that the MADRS is a 60 point scale. Personally, I don't think that this 5% advantage (3 divided by 60 possible points) is worth Seroquel's side effects.

Particularly since this recently published
randomized trial showed that when Seroquel was added to Prozac, it yielded no advantages over placebo, aside from helping patients sleep better over the first few weeks. This was not a study of treatment-resistant patients (unlike the FDA data) but it nonetheless shakes my confidence in the potency of the medication.

If the full FDA decides to go along with the committee's recommendation, AZ will mount the kind of mega direct-to-consumer marketing campaign that we have seen with Abilify (for background, see two excellent LA Times pieces
here and here), and consequently there will be a little epidemic of obesity among depressed patients. Now that's what I call depressing!